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Abstract. It has been argued that within a dynamic setting, without complete information, 
the tax and bribe methods of correcting externalities give asymmetrical results. A model is 
presented which shows that the bribe alternative under such conditions yields optimal results, 
whereas the tax alternative does not. This conclusion is the opposite of conclusions drawn from 
other models advanced in the literature on the subject. It cannot be said that within such 
a setting one policy is better than the other, since all such conclusions depend upon the par- 
ticular characteristics of each model. (Key words: Quality of water; economics; water 
msmagement) 
In their recent article Kamien, Schwartz, and 
Dolbear [Kamien et al., 1966] produced an 
example in a 'dynamic setting, which was in- 
tended to establish the 'basic asymmetry be- 
tween bribes and charges. 'x within the context 
of their model the charge was to be preferred 
to the bribe, since it would always yield the 
optimum amount of waste discharge, whereas 
the bribe would not. By exhibiting a similar 
model that leads to the opposite conclusion, we 
show that such short-run asymmetries result 
from the particular characteristics of each 
model. Hence one cannot say that the asym- 
metries resulting from a particular model are 
'basic.' 
Following along the lines of Kamien et al., 
we will assume that an upstream firm (firm 1) 
produces Q• and deposits waste w into. the 
stream. This firm can treat an amount of waste 
w -- y, where y is the untreated amount, at a 
cost of h(w -- y). (We shall assume that there 
is no other way to treat the waste or, equiva- 
lently, that all other treatment alternatives are 
too costly to consider. We shall also. assume 
that h(w- y) = 0 at w = y.) Following the 
model of Kamien et al., we shall assume that 
there exists a 'river basin authority' that serves 
as the agent through which affected parties may 
x The essential featurbs of their model have been 
nicely summarized by A.M. Freeman III, "Bribes 
and Charges: Some Comments," Water Resources 
Research, 3, 287-288, 1967. 
negotiate. Rather than letting the authority 
serve as a surrogate for all damaged parties as 
is the case in Kamien et al., we shall assume 
that there is a single downstream firm (firm 2) 
producing Q•, which is damaged. Firm 2 is as- 
sumed to have a nonseparable cost function 
C•'(Q2, y), where y is the amount of untreated 
discharge. This is a particularly important devi- 
ation from the model of Kamien et al. It means 
that there is no longer a function G•(y), as in 
Kamien et al., that relates 'social cost' to un- 
treated waste. Attempts to derive such a func- 
tion suffer from the classic problems of the 
allocation of joint costs. A particularly impor- 
tant consequence of this assumption is that 
'marginal social cost,' and hence the optimum 
level of treatment, will depend upon down- 
stream output. 
We shall make one more important deviation 
from Kamien et al. They assume that the amount 
of waste discharge depends upon the upstream 
firm output. We shall assume that this is not 
the case. That is, assume that some activity, 
necessary for production upstream, causes an 
amount of discharge •, and that a change in 
the level of this activity does not change the 
level of Q•. Several different assumptions about 
the upstream production process could yield this 
result. So, whereas Kamien et al. assumed in 
effect that Q2 was constant and w was a variable, 
we shall assume that Q2 is a variable and that 
w is a constant. 
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There is no need to show that in the absence 
of an institution for exchange firm i will under- 
take no treatment, therefore letting y - •. 
The result is the classic problem of externalities. 
In the spirit of the externalities literature and 
Kamien et al. in particular, we shall assume that 
property rights are either given to the upstream 
firm, in which case firm 2 must bribe firm i to 
treat the waste, or, in case property rights are 
granted to firm 2, firm i must compensate 
firm 2 by the amount of the damage (the case 
of the tax). The authority is simply an agent 
that constructs an institutional means by which 
the transfer is made and the gains from exchange 
exhausted. 
With perfect knowledge of demands and costs 
the job of the authority is simple. He simply 
needs to find 
Max P•.Q•.- C2(Q•., y) - h(•v- y) (1) 
The first-order conditions are 
P•.- [OC2(Q•., y)]f(OQ2) - 0 (2) 
-[OC•(Q•., y)]/Oy- [Oh(•- y)]fOy - 0 (3) 
so that solving (2) and (3), the optimum (Q•O, 
yø) is found. 
If rights lie with the downstream firm, the 
authority must use the tax alternative. A tax 
per unit, of y equal to [OC•(Q• ø, yø)]/Oy should 
be levied on firm 1. The firms will have the 
following maximum problems. For firm i we 
have 
Max PlQ1- C•(Q1) - h(•- y) 
Q, ,y 
-- [OC2(Q• ø, yø)fOy]y (4) 
with first-order conditions 
Pl -- [oC•(Q1)]/OQ1 = 0 (5) 
--[Oh(•v- y)]fOy- [OC•(Q• ø,yø)]/Oy- 0 (6) 
For firm 2 we have 
Max P•.Q2 - C•(Q•., y) -]-[OC"(Q• ø, yø)/Oy] y 
with first-order con'dition 
P• -- [OC•(Q•., y)]/OQ• = 0 (S) 
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The solution to the behavioral equations 6 and 
8 yields the optimum Q•O, yO. 
Now suppose that P• changed (as opposed to 
P•, which was assumed by Kamien et al.) and 
the new level P• remains unknown to the au- 
thority. A demand function could be substituted 
in place of P• with no change in the final result. 
This substitution would make the lack of knowl- 
edge assumption more plausible. Or, if imper- 
fect knowledge of demand is not a sufficiently 
realistic assumption, we could have assumed a 
change in the form of the cost function C•(Q•, 
y). 
At this point we should clarify an additional 
point. In the Kamien et aI. paper the language 
of welfare economics is not used. They are 
clearly aware that it could have been used, so 
for the purpose of being brief we will use it. 
If P• changes, and the new level remains un- 
known to the authority, Q•O, yO are no longer 
the optimum quantities, and the proper unit 
tax is no longer [0C•(Q• ø, yø)-l/Oy. There are 
several things that the authority can do, all of 
which, in general, will yield non-optimum re- 
sults. We shall consider only one such alterna- 
tive and indicate some of the problems. 
The authority knows the cost functions 
C2(Q2, y) and h(•v -- y), so that, if the authority 
knows the new optimum output of Q2, say Q•*, 
it could solve the equation (obtained from (3)) 
- [oC•(Q•. *, y)]/Oy - [ahOy -- y)]/Oy = 0 (9) 
to find the optimum output of y, say y*. It 
could then use [Oh(•v- y*)]/Oy as the proper 
unit tax on y. However, the authority does not 
know 
Since the authority does not know the opti- 
mum Q•, it 'might' (following the procedure in 
Kamien et al.) simply use the current output 
of the downstream firm to evaluate marginal 
social costs. The 'authority would solve (3) to 
find y as a function of Q•, y = •(Q•), which 
indicates for each Q• the amount of y that 
equates 'marginal damage cost' with 'marginal 
treatment cost.' 
If the authority follows this procedure, firm 
I will 
Max PiQ1- C•(Q•) - hOv- y) 
(Q4) 1 
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(11) 
There is no problem with 'gaming' on the part 
of firm 1, since for each level of Q• the author- 
ity knows how much y 'should' exist. In the 
case the authority has no power to regulate 
firm behavior, additional problems arise. The 
situation is that of a nonseparable game, and 
knowledge of the outcome depends upon the 
psychology of the players [Davis and Whinston, 
1962]. Firm 1's behavioral equations will simply 
be the first-order condition to (10), which are 
P1- [oCI(Q1)]/OQ1- o (12) 
_Oh(• -- y) _ OC•Q• •(q,) = 0 (13) Oy O•(Q,) 
If Q• is optimum, firm 1's behavior assures the 
optsurn level of y. But firm 2 can solve (13) 
to find y = •(Q,). The first-order condition to 
(11) is therefore 
p•_ ,OC"(Q. y) + C (Q., y) O•(Q.) OQ•Oy 
+ i(q = o 
which obviously does not yield, in general, the 
correc• amount of Q•, and hence the procedure 
does not yield the correct amount of y. Fur- 
the•ore, closer examination of (14) shows that 
in this case it is not the payment of revenues to 
firm 2 alone that causes the 'deviation from 
optimum. Even if firm 2 did not receive the tax 
revenues, the result would be non-optimum. 
In any case, we can conclude that within the 
framework of this model the tax alternative 
does not yield the optimum results. 
Now let us examine the case where property 
rights are given to the upstream firm. Here 
firm 2 must pay firm 1 to treat the waste. To 
achieve this result, the authority should charge 
the downstream firm the cost of waste elimina- 
tion and let the downstream firm choose the 
amount of waste it wants eliminated. Firm 2 
would 
MaxP2Q2-- C(Q2, y) - h(tv- y) -- A (15) 
Q, ,y 
P• [OC2(Q• y)]/OQ•= 0 (16) 
-[OC•Q2, y)]/Oy- [Oh(tv- y)]/Oy = 0 (17) 
are simply the Pareto conditions 5 and 6. When 
solved they yield the optimum outputs Q2, yO. 
Now, the authority offers a bribe to firm i of 
g(y) = {:•-h(tv-- y) if y = yO (18) oth erw is e 
Firm i will then maximize 
Max P1Q1- G(Q1) - g(y) - h(tv- y) (19) 
The equilibrium waste output will be the opti- 
mum y = yO. The constant A assures the au- 
thority tha• firm i will participate in the plan. 
Assume now that there is a change in P2. 
Firm 2, following (16) an'd (17), will indicate 
a new desired level of waste treatment. The 
authority will change the parameters on g(y) 
accordingly. The new resulting level of y will 
be optimum, even though the authority did not 
know the new P•. 
The bribe alternative thus yields the same 
optimum results in the case of imperfect infor- 
mation as it did in the case of perfect informa- 
tion. This was not the case with the tax al- 
ternative. In fact, the bribe alternative would 
remain optimum if the cost function C2(Q,, y) 
changed in a manner unknown to the authority. 
This is not the case with the tax alternative. 
We have thus established a case of asymmetry 
completely opposite to that of Kamien et 
Of course, the model can be changed to yield 
different results. This is just the point. There 
are many types of institutional and/or behav- 
ioral assumptions that will yield any type of 
results desired. There appears, therefore, to be 
no 'basic' asymmetry between bribes and 
changes, contrary to the assertion of Kamien 
et al. 
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